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It is well known that individuals’ risk attitudes are related to behavioral outcomes such as 
smoking, portfolio decisions, and also educational attainment, but there is barely any 
evidence on whether parental risk attitudes affect the educational attainment of dependent 
children. We add to this literature and examine children’s secondary school track choice in 
Germany where tracking occurs at age ten and has a strong binding character. Our results 
indicate no consistent patterns for paternal risk preferences but a strong negative impact of 
maternal risk aversion on children’s enrollment in upper secondary school. 
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The decision about which educational path children should follow has far-reaching conse-
quences into their future adult life, and in particular so in countries with early tracking such as
Germany. If later revision of the decision is costly so that upward mobility between tracks is
low, early tracking largely predetermines students’ ﬁnal secondary schooling achievement and
their vocational or academic career. Children’s future social and economic situation therefore
strongly depends on the "right" school track choice.
With respect to the determinants of this choice, one comes across a vast literature on the
transmission of socio-economic status suggesting for high social selectivity.1 This means that
parental education, as a compound measure for parents’ cognitive skills and for investments
into their children, is still the most important factor for children’s educational attainment (e.g.
Heineck and Riphahn, 2009, for Germany; Ermisch and Francesconi, 2001, for the UK). In
addition, there are studies that e.g. look at the inﬂuence of family income (Acemoglu and
Pischke, 2001; Blanden and Gregg, 2004) or parental (un)employment (Bratberg, Anti Nilsen,
and Vaage, 2008; Coelli, 2010) on children’s education. Apart from that, there is barely any re-
search in economics addressing whether parental attitudes towards education or other, possibly
non-cognitive skills matter for their children’s secondary schooling.2
Educational decisions might however be considered as investment with uncertain outcomes,
which may then be subject to individuals’ risk preferences. Everything else constant, it is
therefore plausible to assume that risk preferences will also matter if individuals have to decide
1In economics, intergenerational mobility research has a focus mainly on income (see the
work of Solon (1992) which has initiated a large body of research) whereas it is social
class mobility that is of interest in the sociological literature (for example, Erikson and
Goldthorpe, 2002)
2Yet, there is interest into this issue in sociology showing that, for example, parents’ educa-
tional aspirations matter (Henz and Maas, 1995; Paulus and Blossfeld, 2007).
1on their children’s educational paths. The direction of the effect, however, is unclear a priori.
If future returns are uncertain, risk averse individuals might more likely choose a less risky
schooling path (either for themselves or for their children) where less risky might refer to both
a shorter time spent in education and lower ability requirements. On the other hand, there is
pervasive evidence on the positiveeffects of education on labor market success, so that it might
also be that education is used as "safe haven", i.e. has an insurance character.
Given these two contradictory notions, it is unsurprising that the few empirical studies that
address the relationship between individuals’risk attitudes and their own educational outcomes
yield ambiguous ﬁndings (Belzil, 2007; Brown, Ortiz, and Taylor, 2006, see in more detail
below). Beyond that we are aware of only one prior study by Leonardi (2007) who examines
the relationship between parents’ risk preferences and their children’s secondary schooling
track. Using data from the Bank of Italy Survey of Income and Wealth (SHIW), he concludes
that parental risk attitudes are no major determinant of school track choice.
We add to this scarce literature using data from Germany. Again, this is interesting and
relevant, since 1) the German educational system streams children in different schooling tracks
at age ten, i.e. very early in the life course and 2) mobility between tracks is low so that the
initial choice has a strong predetermining character. In contrast to previousresearch, where risk
attitudes are usually derived from hypothetical lottery scenarios, we employ the individuals’
willingness to take risks in their career, which we believe to be a more appropriate indicator
than the overall risk attitude.
Ourresultsindicatethat fathers’risk preferences playmainlyno consistentrolefor children’s
secondary schooling track choice which is in line with Leonardi (2007). We however ﬁnd a
substantial negative effect of maternal risk aversion on the probability of choosing the upper
secondary, i.e. the university qualifying school track.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We next brieﬂy introduce the German
school system. Section 3 outlines the role of risk preferences for educational outcomes and
gives a short overview of prior research. In section 4, we introduce data and methods. Section
5 provides the estimation results, and section 6 discusses robustness checks. We conclude in
section 7.
22. The German school system
Education in Germany is not the own responsibility of the federal government but each of the
16 federal states is in charge for its educational system. However, the main features of the ed-
ucational system are nearly identical: Children between age three and six might, but most not
attend pre-school kindergarten. Compulsory school attendance begins with entrance into ele-
mentary school at the age of six, and ends at the age of 16. Between age six and ten, i.e. from
grade one to four,3 education in elementary school provides basic training in reading, writing,
basic mathematical skills, as well as in creative and technical subjects such as music, sports,
painting and practical work.
[Figure 1 about here]
After completing primary school, school tracking sets in and children are streamed into dif-
ferent secondary schooling tracks (Figure 1), based on parents’ preferred choices and teachers’
recommendation that is given at the end of elementary school. This recommendation, which
is binding in some but not all federal states,4 is to be based on students’ abilities so that the
recommended secondary school track should be the most suitable for the student. The three
dominant secondary school types are lower secondary school (Hauptschule), intermediate sec-
ondary school (Realschule), and upper secondary school (Gymnasium), which cover about 80
percent of students.5
3In two federal states, Berlin and Brandenburg, elementary schooling ends at age twelve, i.e.
the end of grade six.
4In 2004, it is binding in four (Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Saxony, Thuringia) out of six-
teen federal states, but parents can challenge the recommendation for example via an as-
sessment by specialized teachers or by entrance exams for the school track they want to
have their child attend.
5Other school types include comprehensive schools, special schools and some few other,
3Lower secondary school as well as intermediate secondary school lasts for ﬁve to six years
and provides the basis for further (blue and white collar) vocational apprenticeship training.
Upper secondary school track lasts for nine years6 and provides - with the Abitur as graduation
certiﬁcate - the fastest and direct path to tertiary education on universities and universities of
applied sciences (Fachhochschulen).
In general, transition between secondary schooling tracks is possible although requirements
differ across states. Individuals can for example ’upgrade’ in a couple of federal states: After
completion of lower secondary school, students can achieve the intermediate schooling degree
(Mittlere Reife) within one additional year. Transition to the upper secondary schooling track
from both lower and intermediate secondary track is also possible but subject to entrance re-
quirements, such as having achieved a speciﬁc grade level and having a good command of a
another foreign language in addition to English. Now, although transition between tracks is
possible after the initial track choice, it is rare (Bellenberg, Hovestadt, and Klemm, 2004) and
thus predetermines students’ ﬁnal educational attainment to a large extent.7 Parents’ prefer-
ences and attitudes, including their attitudes towards risk therefore play a major role in this
decision process and their children’s future education outcome.
mainly private progressive education alternatives such as Waldorf schools or Montessori
schools. Although privately organized, these schools are also subject to the curricula of the
federal state’s Ministry of Education.
6Reduction to eight years has been agreed upon, but the adjustment has not yet been realized
in all federal states.
7Beyond that, there is evidence for social selectivity at both the initial and later transition
stages (cf., for example, Jacob and Tieben, 2009, Glaesser and Cooper, 2010).
43. Risk preferences and educational outcomes
Itisawellknownfact thateducationalattainmentcorrelates stronglywithlabormarketsuccess:
No or lower educational attainment is associated to a higher risk of unemployment and to
unstable and low paid jobs. In contrast, higher education is a good predictor for access to well
paid and stable jobs with good career prospects. Why then should individuals not be willing
to invest in education beyond compulsory basic education in order to minimize negative long-
term consequences? In the context of this analysis, the question is why parents should not want
their children to be streamed into the higher secondary school track?
One possible answer to this question is that, in terms of human capital, educational attain-
ment is an investment into future payoffs and as such is a decision under risk where risk may
play a role at the aggregate and the individual level. At the aggregate level, random events
such as the recent economic crisis or external effects such as technological or political changes
may shift sectoral demand which may affect individuals’unemploymentrisk but also their rates
of returns (Leonardi, 2007). This kind of external "market risk" represents an important risk
factor, which however cannot be controlled by the individuals.
At the individual level, and focussing on the school track choice, the decision on education
should ﬁrst of all be based on teachers’ and parents’ assessment of the child’s cognitive and
non-cognitive abilities, proxied by for example exam marks and whether the child is motivated
to learn. Exact predictions of a child’s future achievements however are not possible so that it
is not clear whether both monetary expenditures and non-monetary opportunity costs will pay
off. Such unknown probabilities of the individual’s achievement - including for example the
risk of dropping out from higher secondary schooling - can discourage risk averse individuals
to invest in human capital or education already at the outset.
Given a level of a child’s abilities that would allow attending the higher secondary school
track, we would in sum expect that educational decisions are subject to individuals’ risk prefer-
ences. As noted above, there however are two possible, contradictory effects. On the one hand,
if future returns to education are uncertain, risk averse individuals will avoid such investments
and we would therefore expect risk averse parents to be in favor for the lower secondary school
track. On the other hand, higher education might be thought of as "safe haven", i.e. as type of
5insurance since the positive correlation between educational attainment and labor market out-
comes is well-known. Risk averse parents might then less likely want their children enrolled in
the lower secondary school track.
While this ambiguity is not satisfactory from a theoretical point of view, we believe that it is
the ﬁrst notion - risk averse individuals shy away from investments with uncertain outcomes -
that is the mechanism at work here, even more so since previous evidence yields results in line
with this argument.
Previous research
First, there is substantial evidence that risk attitudes are related to adult individuals’ behavior
andoutcomesincludinglabormarketsuccess. Hartog, Ferrer-i Carbonell, andJonker(2002)for
example show that women as well as civil servants are more risk averse than their counterparts,
but that self-employed are more willing to take risks. Bonin et al. (2007) use data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), the data we also use in the analyses below, and show
that individuals with low willingness to take risks are more likely to be sorted into occupations
with low earnings risk. Pfeifer (2009) also uses SOEP data and ﬁnds positive correlations
between risk taking attitudes and being employed via temporary agency work, or having a
ﬁxed-term contract, between risk taking and the workers’ likelihood of changing the employer
or quitting their job, and between risk taking and participation in further training. In line with
these ﬁndings, he shows in another study that more risk averse individuals sort into the public
sector (Pfeifer, 2010).
There further is research on the relationship between individuals’ risk attitudes and their
own educational attainment. In an early study, Weiss (1972) uses data from the 1966 National
Register of Scientiﬁc and Technical Personnel and provides evidence for a negative impact of
risk aversion on human capital investments and on the returns to education. The results of
Shaw (1996), which are based on data from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, indicate a
positive correlation between risk taking behavior and wage growth as well as higher returns to
education for less risk averse persons. In contrast, Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997)
describe a u-shaped relationship between risk tolerance and years of education with the peak at
12 years which is in line with the ﬁndings of Brown, Ortiz, and Taylor (2006) who use the U.S.
6Panel Study of Income Dynamcis (PSID). Belzil and Leonardi (2007) use the Italian Survey of
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) to explain differences in schooling by individual risk
heterogeneity. Their results indicate only a small negative effect of risk attitudes on schooling
attainment.
In addition, there so far is only one study by Leonardi (2007) that addresses whether parents’
risk attitudes play a role for the schooling track decision of their young adult (19-23 years)
children. Using 1995 Italian SHIW data, he concludes that differences in risk attitudes are
no important determinant of secondary school choice. While this ﬁnding is at odds with our
expectations, note that his analysis differs from ours inasmuch as he 1) examines the outcomes
of individuals in the age range 19-23 whereas we look at younger children, and 2) he uses a
risk aversion measures derived from a hypothetical lottery question while we base our analyses
on parents’ willingness to take risks in their occupational career. As noted above, we believe
this to be a more appropriate measure for analyzing the gradient between risk attitudes and
investments in human capital.
4. Data and methods
Our analyses are based on data from the German Socio-economic Panel Study (SOEP). The
SOEP is a representative, annual household panel study that started in 1984 in West Germany
with more than 12,000 adult respondents in about 5,900 households. It was extended to former
East Germany in 1990 and refreshed with additional samples later on, so that it now consists
of more than 20,000 adults. The SOEP is a quite rich database including a wide range of in-
formation on the socioeconomic status of both private households and individuals (see Wagner,
Frick, and Schupp, 2007).
Asweare interestedin therisk-educationgradientforstudents’initialsecondary schooltrack
choice 8 we restrict our sample to adult respondents with children who are 10 to 15 years old.
8We cannot rule out that the observed school track is not the initial choice, but we believe that
the potential error is small because of the low mobility across tracks.
7We thus focus on children who do not yet acquired the ﬁrst possible school leaving certiﬁcate
and who could then for example be enrolled in further education in order to upgrade. Another
reason for the upper age bound is that adolescents quite likely start to act stronger on their own
behalf so that we could not be sure whether the track we observe at age 16 or older is the one
that, we argue, was ﬁrst dominated by the parents’ expectations and preferences.
As for the child’s secondary school track choice, we focus on the three major schooling
tracks as outlined above: lower secondary (Hauptschule), intermediate secondary (Realschule)




      
      
1, if the child attends the lower secondary schooling track (Hauptschule)
2, if the child attends the intermediate secondary schooling track (Realschule)
3, if the child attends the upper secondary schooling track (Gymnasium)
Information on individuals’ risk attitudes were ﬁrst surveyed in 2004. In addition to a hy-
pothetical lottery question, the questionnaire includes several items on the respondent’s self-
reported general and context-speciﬁc risk attitudes. General risk attitudes are surveyed asking
"How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do
you try to avoid taking risks?", to which answers could be given on a 11-point Likert-type scale
from 0 (risk averse) to 10 (fully prepared to take risks). Context-speciﬁc risk attitudes are mea-
sured as answers to "People can behave differently in different situations. How would you rate
your willingness to take risks in the following areas?", where areas mentioned are risk taking
while driving, in ﬁnancial matters, during leisure and sport, in the respondent’s occupational
career, with his or her health, and his or her faith in other people.
While previous research on the education-risk gradient is based on risk measures derived
from lottery questions (see the literature references above), Dohmen et al. (2005) experimen-
tally validate that the self-reported risk measures as surveyed in the SOEP are valid predictors
for individuals’ risk taking behavior. They further point out that context-speciﬁc risk attitudes
are good predictors for context-speciﬁc behavioral outcomes. Individuals’ risk attitude towards
health, for example, is a better predictor for their health behavior than the lottery question
8measure. We therefore base our analyses on the individuals’ risk taking willingness in his or
her occupational career which we believe to be the more appropriate measure with regard to
the gradient between risk and human capital investments. We however run additional analyses
using both risk taking willingness in ﬁnancial matters and the general risk taking attitudes as
robustness checks (see below).
Given the ordinal 11-point scale, we could generate up to eleven risk attitude dummies.
This however is unhandy for interpretation so that we calculate mean and standard deviation
separately by mothers’ and fathers’ career risk attitudes in order to create the three following
risk categories:9
A parent is
• risk averse, if her response value X is smaller than the mean (m) minus the standard
deviation (s): X < m - s,
• risk neutral, if X is in a range between mean plus/minus one standard deviation: m - s
<= X <= m + s,
• risk loving, if X is larger than the mean plus the standard deviation: X > m + s.
Since there is evidence that 1) males and females differ in their willingness to take risks
(Dohmen et al., 2005) and that 2) mothers are much more involved in their children’s schooling
activities (Enders-Dragässer, Sellach, and Libuda-Köster, 2004; Oesterbacka, Merz, and Zick,
2010) which might lead to a bigger inﬂuence of particularly mothers’ risk attitudes in the track-
ing decision, we run separate analyses for mothers and fathers. Our ﬁnal sample consists of
1,207 mother-child observations and of 1,000 father-child observations10.
9Note again that the variable is measured on an ordinal and not on a metric scale. Compared
with other approaches, like a more or less arbitrary separation in four or ﬁve categories, we
prefer using information from the observed distributions.
10See the Appendix for descriptive statistics.
9A ﬁrst impression of the relationship is given in Figure 2 which provides the distribution
of children’s secondary school track choice by their parents’ willingness to take risks in their
occupational career. It shows that children of risk loving parents are much more likely enrolled
in the upper secondary school track whereas children of risk averse mothers are more likely
enrolled in the lower secondary school track.
[Figure 2 about here]
Since these descriptive ﬁndings can be confounded by other factors we control for a large
range of socio-demographic and -economic characteristics in our regression analyses below.
Parents’ education clearly is a key determinant of children’s secondary school track choice. In
line with the structure of the educational system outlined above, we include whether the parent
has acquired a lower, intermediateor upper secondary schooling degree, and we further include
adummyonwhethertheparent’seducationinformationismissing. Parents’employmentstatus
is another relevant covariate since it relates to the household’s budget constraint and might
also be related to the time parents can invest in assisting their children for example, in doing
homework. The monetary budget constraint is further accounted for by the log of the monthly
net equivalence household income. More controls are the child’s age, whether the child is a
boy, three dummies on the number of children in the family (only child, two siblings, three and
more siblings), the parent’s age (at birth of the child), and whether the parent has Non-German
nationality.
We moreover include the size of the respondents’ residence to capture possible differences
between rural and non-rural areas in the supply of intermediate and particularly upper sec-
ondary schools. As outlined above, the role of teachers’ track recommendation after primary
school differs in the federal states. We add a dummyfor the four federal states (Bavaria, Baden-
Württemberg, Saxony, Thuringia), where the recommendation is binding.
Given the categorical character of our dependent variable, we use the multinomial logit esti-
mator which allows for differences in each covariate’s marginal effect across categories.11 Our
11We tested whether the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption underlying
the multinomial logit model holds and found no evidence to the contrary.
10baselinemodel then describes thecorrelation between thechild’s secondary school track choice
and a vector of covariates Pr(Yi = j|Xi), where X comprises the parent’s risk attitude as well as
the above noted controls.
In order to capture the relation between the parent’s own education and his or her risk atti-
tude, we extend our baseline speciﬁcation by including terms interacting the respondent’s risk
attitude and his or her highest educational achievement. To avoid the issues that come along
with the calculation of marginal effects in non-linear models that include interaction terms (Ai
and Norton, 2003; Greene, 2010), we simulate changes in parents’ risk preferences in order to
calculate the corresponding conditional predicted probabilities of the child’s secondary school
track choice: Pr(Yi|parent’srisk attitude), where parent’s risk attitudecould be averse or neutral
or loving.
Since we are mainly interested in the effects of risk aversion vs. the willingness to take risks,
we calculate the following differences:
DL = Pr(lower track | parent is risk averse)−Pr(lower track | parent is risk loving)
DI = Pr(intermediate track | parent is risk averse)−Pr(intermediate track | parent is risk loving)
DU = Pr(upper track | parent is risk averse)−Pr(upper track | parent is risk loving)
In addition to ourbaseline speciﬁcations werun thefollowingrobustness tests: 1) we employ
the individual’s score on the risk willingness scale, i.e. we use a quasi-metric measure; 2) in
order to check sensitivity of the risk measure used, we employ the individual’s general risk
willingness attitude as well as her risk attitude in ﬁnancial matters. As a further extension, we
are interested in whether there are differences by child gender so that we run separate analyses
for mother/father-son/daughter subsamples.
115. Results
Table 1 and 2 report average marginal effects (Bartus, 2005) for the baseline model, separately
for mothers and fathers, showing the impact of the independent variables on the secondary
school choice probabilities. First, and unsurprising, the most inﬂuential control variables are
parent’s education and household income. Having a parent with an upper secondary schooling
degree increases the probability of the child being enrolled in the upper secondary school-
ing track by about 21 percentage points (mothers, Table 1) or almost 24 percentage points
(fathers, Table 2), compared to a child whose mother or father achieved an intermediate sec-
ondary schooling degree. A complementing picture is found for parents with lower secondary
schooling degree, whose children are more likely enrolled in the lower secondary school track.
That is, we ﬁnd evidence for a strong education transmission from parents to children which is
in line with previous research on intergenerational education mobility (Heineck and Riphahn,
2009). Children in higher income households also have greater chances for enrollment in the
upper secondary school track. Moreover, living in a federal state where teachers’ recommen-
dation is binding is associated with higher probabilities of enrollment in the lower secondary
track and, complementary to this, with lower probabilities of enrollment in the upper secondary
track.12
Regarding our central interest, the estimates ﬁrst suggest for no impact of a high parental
willingness to take risks on children’s secondary school track choice, compared to an average
risk taking attitude. Having a risk averse mother, however, is correlated with a 9 percentage
point decrease in the probability of the child being enrolled in the upper secondary school track
and 6 percentage points increase for enrollment in the lower secondary school track. This may
seem a modest effect but it comes close to the association between binding teachers’ recom-
mendation and children’s secondary school enrollment. The overall pattern also indicates a
substantial gradient: conditional on mothers’ risk attitude, the predicted probabilities imply
12Intuitively, it is plausible to assume that parents avoid the costs that come along with chal-
lenging a binding recommendation.
12that the higher a mother’s risk willingness, the more likely is enrollment in upper secondary
school and the less likely is enrollment in the lower secondary school track (cf. the lower panel
in Table 1).
[Table 1 about here]
While this ﬁnding is in line with the above mentioned notion that education is looked at as
a risky investment from which risk averse individuals shy away, we ﬁnd a somewhat different
pattern for fathers. In particular, the estimates indicate a small negative weakly statistically
signiﬁcant association between father’s risk aversion and the child’s enrollment in the lower
secondary school track (Table 2, column 1). This is at odds with our preferred hypothesis
but in line with the “safe haven” notion. Yet, the negative sign of the average marginal effect
of father’s risk aversion on the child’s enrollment in the upper schooling track may indicate
that fathers opt for a middle way. In addition, calculating predicted probabilities conditional
on fathers’ risk willingness (cf. the lower panel in Table 2), we ﬁnd only little differences in
children’s secondary school track choice as fathers’ attitude towards risk in their occupational
career varies.
[Table 2 about here]
As a next step, we extend our baseline model and include interaction terms of parental risk
attitudes and education in order to control for the relation between parent’s own education and
her or his risk attitude. Similar to the conditional predicted probabilities above, we calculate
differences in the predicted school enrollment outcomes after varying parental risk attitudes,
while all other covariates, including parental education, are kept at the observed values. The
results of these simulation exercises are provided in Table 3.
[Table 3 about here]
13They reinforce the ﬁndings of our baseline models inasmuch as there is no convincing ev-
idence for a link between fathers’ risk attitude and their child’s school track but a striking
gradient between mothers’ risk attitude and their child’s secondary school track enrollment. In
particular, the difference in predicted probabilities of enrollment in the lower track amounts to
about 6.9 percentage points conditional on the mother being either risk averse or risk loving.
That is, having a risk averse mother rather than a risk loving mother signiﬁcantly increases
the child’s probability of being enrolled in the lowest secondary school track. The impact of
maternal risk attitudes are even stronger looking at the upper secondary school track: There is
a difference of some 10 percentage points in predicted probabilities meaning that the child of a
risk loving mother is much more likely enrolled in the directly university-qualifying schooling
track.
6. Robustness
Using the metric scale
In our baseline models above, we use categorical risk variables as derived from the underlying
risk attitude distributions. In order to examine the stability of our ﬁrst ﬁndings, we now employ
the score on the Likert-type scale itself. The results in Table 4 mainly show similar patterns
as compared to the estimations that include risk categories. An increase in fathers’ risk will-
ingness by one unit is not statistically associated to children’s secondary school track anymore.
The pattern however is the same as found above inasmuch as the average marginal effects hint
towards a, say, u-shaped gradient. In line with our baseline model ﬁndings, there again is evi-
dence for a monotonic relation between mother’s occupational career risk willingness and her
child’s secondary school track: a one unit increase in risk willingness decreases the predicted
probabilities of enrollment in the lower track and increases enrollment in the upper track by
one percentage point respectively.
[Table 4 about here]
14Figure 3 features this result again showing that, irrespective of the mother having either a
lower or an upper secondary schooling degree, the child’s probabilities of being enrolled in
the upper secondary schooling track increases by roughly ten percentage points increasing the
maternal risk taking willingness from 0 to 10. Complementing this, an increase in risk taking
willingness over the whole range decreases lower secondary school enrollment also by about
ten percentage points.
[Figure 3 about here]
General risk taking and risk attitudes towards ﬁnancial matters
As outlined above, our analysis differs from the existing studies (for example, Belzil and
Leonardi, 2007; Leonardi, 2007) inasmuch as we do not employ individuals’ risk aversion
derived from hypothetical lottery questions, but respondents’ self-reported risk attitudes to-
wards occupational career. Again, in line with Dohmen et al. (2005) who point out that using
hypothetical lottery scenarios can mislead when predicting context speciﬁc behavior (p. 30),
we argue that this is better suited in order to capture the relation between risk taking attitudes
and human capital investments. We however run further robustness checks to accommodate
prior research by using 1) individuals’ general risk taking attitudes, which is a better overall
risk behavior predictor than a lottery measure (Dohmen et al., 2005), and 2) their risk taking
willingness in ﬁnancial matters.
Compared to the ﬁndings from our preferred model, the results for individuals’ general risk
taking attitudes imply slightly different ﬁndings for mothers but similar ones for fathers: while
mothers’ risk aversion estimates above suggest for a monotonic inverse gradient, the results
now indicate no statistical association. There however is an almost 5 percentage points de-
crease for risk loving mothers in the probability of their child’s enrollment in the lower sec-
ondary school track (Table 5, column 1) which complements the prior ﬁnding. Similar to the
results that employ risk taking in occupational career, we ﬁnd a 2.5 percentage point decrease
for risk averse fathers that the child is enrolled in the lower secondary track. This again hints
towards the “safe haven” hypothesis, even more so since we further ﬁnd a ten percentage point
15increase in the predicted probability that the child is streamed into the intermediate secondary
schooling track. The negativesign of the average marginal effect on the enrollment in the upper
secondary track would again suggest for shying away from this option, yet this is not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant.
[Table 5 about here]
The results for risk taking in ﬁnancial matters (Table 6) are almost the same for mothers as
the results for the general risk taking attitudes . There, ﬁrst, is an about 5 percentage point de-
crease in the predicted lower secondary track enrollment for risk loving mothers but otherwise
no convincing statistical association. Again in line with the ﬁndings for fathers so far, there is
no evidence for risk loving attitudes on children’s secondary school track choice. The results
however once more indicate that risk averse fathers opt for the average inasmuch as we ﬁnd a 9
percentage point increase in the probability of the child being enrolled in the intermediate track
and an 11 point decrease of enrollment in the upper secondary track.
[Table 6 about here]
For both robustness tests, i.e. employing general risk attitudes and risk taking in ﬁnancial
matters, we also carried out simulation exercises similar to the ones in our baseline model. We
do not present these ﬁndings since the differences in the predicted probabilities are mainly not
statistically different from zero. There are two exceptions: similar to the ﬁndings for mothers
above, there is a ten percentage points difference in the lower track enrollment probability for
a mother who is either risk averse or risk loving in ﬁnancial matters with a higher probability
found for the risk averse mother. We, second, ﬁnd an eight percentage points increase the
child’s probability of being enrolled in the upper secondary track once we vary fathers’ risk
attitude from aversion to risk taking willingness also in ﬁnancial matters.13
13Full details are available upon request.
16Differences by child gender?
Recent research further suggests for gender-speciﬁc intergenerational education transmission,
i.e. that fathers’ education is more important for the educational achievement of sons and, sim-
ilarly, mother’s education is more relevant for daughters’ educational outcomes (e.g. Dearden,
Machin, and Reed, 1997; Heineck and Riphahn, 2009; Kleinjans, 2010).
Given this evidence and the observation that risk taking willingness differs between males
and females (Dohmen et al., 2005), we extend our analysis and separate the samples by the
child’s sex in order to examine whether parent’s risk attitudes affect boys’ or girls’ secondary
school enrollment differently (Table 7). Our results highlight two ﬁndings: First, parental risk
attitudesplayalargerrolefordaughtersthanforsons,inasmuchasnoneoftheaveragemarginal
effects on the outcomes of boys is statistically different from zero, irrespective of whether we
look at the mother-son or father-son gradient. Second, we again ﬁnd hints towards different
underlying mechanisms for father and mothers. In line with the ﬁndings of our baseline model
above, having a risk averse mother is associated with a decrease of about 8 percentage points
in the daughter’s probability of being enrolled in the lower secondary track, the negative effect
of risk aversion on the child’s enrollment in the upper tracks however just misses the 10%-
signiﬁcance threshold (which quite likely is because of the small subsample size). For fathers,
we again ﬁnd that risk aversion is negatively associated with enrollment, but that risk loving
substantially decreases the boy’s chances of being enrolled in the intermediate secondary track
and substantially increases his probability of being enrolled in the upper track, with changes of
almost 14 and 17 percentage points respectively.
As a ﬁnal exercise, we generate a joint indicator for parental attitudes, built up on the distri-
bution of the average of mothers’ and fathers’ risk attitude scores. The ﬁndings represent a
mixture of our results above: In line with the evidence for fathers, joint parental risk aversion
decreases the probability of child’s enrollment in the lower secondary track, and full risk taking
willingness increases the enrollment probability in the upper secondary school track which is
in line with the evidence for the father-daughter gradient. However, since the sample size does
not allow to further disentangle the ’intra-parental’ risk composition, which would be a more
fruitful approach, we do not want to overemphasize this additional, complementary ﬁnding.
17[Table 7 about here]
7. Summary and conclusions
There is growing research addressing the effects of individuals’ cognitive and non-cognitive
skills on different labor market outcomes (see Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and Ter Weel,
2008, for an overview). The role of individuals’risk attitudes has also attracted scholarly effort
within this strand of research (ibid., p. 1002 f.) but has largely concentrated on issues such
as portfolio choice, occupational choice, or earnings. Yet, as future outcomes of individuals’
educational choices are uncertain and might thus represent risky investments, it is plausible to
assume that individual’s risk taking willingness may have an impact on educational choices of
the individual herself but also that her risk attitude affects the educational path of her children.
Theoretically, it is however not that clear a priori whether risk averse individuals would try
to avoid educational investmentsas education might also serve as “safe haven”, i.e. would have
an insurance type character. Our analysis sheds light on this issue and we examine whether
parental risk attitudes are associated to the secondary school track choice of their children and
which of the two mechanisms is at work.
We add to an almost non-existent literature, with the study of Leonardi (2007) as the only
prior research on the parent-children gradient. We explore the German case which is as inter-
esting and possibly even more relevant because of the institutional setting that streams children
at age ten, i.e. very early, into different secondary school tracks. Upward mobility between
tracks is low so that the initial choice has a strong predetermining character.
Our results imply the following: 1) everything else constant, risk averse mothers are more
likely to have their child enrolled in the lower secondary schooling track, and particularly so if
thechildisagirl, andlesslikelyenrolledintheuppersecondarytrack. Withsubstantialchanges
in the predicted probabilities (6 and 10 percentage points respectively), this supports the notion
that education is looked at as risky investment. 2) In contrast, the ﬁndings for father are not as
18convincing and consistent as for mothers and are more in line with the “safe haven” argument
inasmuch as the children of risk averse fathers are less likely enrolled in the lower secondary
school track. We again ﬁnd a stronger effect for daughters which is further complemented by
the evidence that daughters of risk loving fathers are much more likely enrolled in the upper
secondary track which directly qualiﬁes for entrance in universities.
Social mobility is strongly determined by patterns of intergenerational transmission mecha-
nisms. Our ﬁndings show that there are factors other than parental education or income, that
affect one of the most critical decisions for children’s later life course. As such, our ﬁndings
reinforce the recent evidence in economics that non-cognitive skills do matter for labor market
and educational outcomes and extend it inasmuch as such skills play a role, not only of the
individual itself but also for her or his children. Given that our analysis is only the second
attempt to explore this speciﬁc question it might be too early to deduce policy implications on
the individual level. Yet, it might either way be useful to consider relaxing the requirements for
particularly upward track mobility so that a possibly wrong initial choice based on, amongst
other things, parental risk taking attitudes could be more easily reversed.
19Tables
Table 1: Children’s secondary school track choice: Baseline speciﬁcation for mothers
Pr(y=lower sec.) Pr(y=secondary) Pr(y=upper sec.)
Average Marginal Effects
Risk averse (Career) 0.059∗∗ 0.032 −0.091∗∗
(0.027) (0.042) (0.042)
Risk loving (Career) −0.017 0.008 0.009
(0.021) (0.040) (0.040)
Mother’s education: lower sec. 0.212∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗ −0.136∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.035) (0.037)
Mother’s education: upper sec. −0.051∗∗∗ −0.163∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.031) (0.034)
Mother’s education: missing 0.139∗∗∗ −0.088 −0.052
(0.050) (0.055) (0.063)
Mother’s age at birth −0.008∗∗∗ −0.005 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Mother: Migrant −0.006 0.026 −0.020
(0.024) (0.055) (0.057)
Mother’s employment: Unemployed −0.023 0.018 0.005
(0.020) (0.045) (0.046)
Mother’s employment: Part-time −0.032∗ 0.007 0.024
(0.017) (0.040) (0.040)
Male child 0.049∗∗ −0.004 −0.045
(0.021) (0.029) (0.030)
Child’s age −0.040∗∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
Number of siblings: 0 0.023 0.006 −0.029
(0.028) (0.046) (0.045)
Number of siblings: 2 −0.009 0.042 −0.033
(0.019) (0.038) (0.038)
Number of siblings: 3 or more 0.047 0.021 −0.067
(0.030) (0.046) (0.047)
Equiv. net HH-income −0.156∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.033) (0.030)




Pr(.../mother’s risk attitude = averse) 0.313∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.033) (0.031)
Pr(.../mother’s risk attitude = neutral) 0.240∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Pr(.../mother’s risk attitude = loving) 0.216∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.035) (0.033)
Notes: Multinomial Logit estimation, average marginal effects. N=1,207 mother-child ob-
servations. The estimation further controls for size of residence ﬁxed effects. Predictions
are generated as the average of all individual predicted probabilities (calculated with the
individually observed values of the covariates), after mother’s risk attitude variable is mod-
iﬁed. Standard errors in parentheses. *** ** ** signiﬁcant at 1% 5% 10%.
Source: SOEP, 2004. Authors’ own calculations.
20Table 2: Children’s secondary school track choice: Baseline speciﬁcation for fathers
Pr(y=lower sec.) Pr(y=secondary) Pr(y=upper sec.)
Average Marginal Effects
Risk averse (Career) −0.025∗ 0.031 −0.006
(0.015) (0.051) (0.052)
Risk loving (Career) −0.020 −0.026 0.047
(0.014) (0.042) (0.044)
Father’s education: lower 0.143∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.157∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.043) (0.041)
Father’s education: upper sec. −0.046∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.035) (0.038)
Father’s education: missing 0.067 −0.170∗∗∗ 0.103
(0.044) (0.055) (0.071)
Father’s age at birth −0.003 −0.002 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Father: Migrant 0.046 0.125∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.059) (0.058)
Father’s employment: Unemployed 0.087∗∗ 0.007 −0.094
(0.039) (0.064) (0.069)
Father’s employment: Part-time 0.112 0.004 −0.115
(0.073) (0.107) (0.107)
Male child 0.026 −0.047 0.021
(0.017) (0.033) (0.035)
Child’s age −0.039∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.016∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Number of siblings: 0 0.004 −0.000 −0.004
(0.025) (0.056) (0.057)
Number of siblings: 2 0.009 0.069 −0.078∗
(0.019) (0.044) (0.044)
Number of siblings: 3 or more 0.048∗ 0.056 −0.104∗∗
(0.028) (0.052) (0.052)
Equiv. net HH-income −0.082∗∗ −0.103∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.041) (0.037)




Pr(.../father’s risk attitude = averse) 0.193∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.037) (0.036)
Pr(.../father’s risk attitude = neutral) 0.243∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
Pr(.../father’s risk attitude = loving) 0.206∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
Notes: Multinomial Logit estimation, average marginal effects. N=1,000 father-child ob-
servations. The estimation further controls for size of residence ﬁxed effects. Predictions
are generated as the average of all individual predicted probabilities (calculated with the in-
dividuallyobserved valuesofthecovariates), after father’s risk attitudevariableismodiﬁed.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** ** ** signiﬁcant at 1% 5% 10%.
Source: SOEP, 2004. Authors’ own calculations.
21Table 3: Predicted Probabilities, Simulation results: Extended speciﬁcation
Predicted school track
Mother’s risk attitude (Career) lower sec. secondary upper sec.
P(...| mother = risk averse (career), IA) 0.2760 0.3576 0.3665
P(...| mother = risk neutral (career), IA) 0.2387 0.3274 0.4340
P(...| mother = risk loving (career), IA) 0.2074 0.3217 0.4709
D averse-loving 0.0685∗ 0.0358 −0.1044∗∗
(0.0409) (0.0515) (0.0471)
Father’s risk attitude (Career) lower sec. secondary upper sec.
P(...| father = risk averse, IA) 0.1903 0.3667 0.4430
P(...| father = risk neutral, IA) 0.2423 0.3159 0.4418
P(...| father = risk loving, IA) 0.2104 0.3113 0.4784
D averse-loving −0.0200 0.0554 −0.0354
(0.0410) (0.0494) (0.0451)
Notes: N=1,207 (1,000) mother-(father-)child observations. Standard errors (in parenthe-
ses) are obtained via bootstrap with 500 repeated draws. *** ** ** signiﬁcant at 1% 5%
10%.
Source: SOEP, 2004. Authors’ own calculations.
22Table 4: Children’s secondary school track choice: Estimates using parental risk attitude as
metric variable.
Pr(y=lower sec.) Pr(y=secondary) Pr(y=upper sec.)
Average Marginal Effects
Mother’s risk willingness (Career) −0.010∗∗ −0.000 0.010∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Father’s risk willingness (Career) 0.001 −0.009 0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Notes: Multinomial logit estimation, average marginal effects. N=1,207 (1,000) mother-
(father-)child observations. The estimations are separately estimated for the mother-child
and father-childsampleand are based on thebaselinespeciﬁcation includingthesameset of
control variables. Risk willingness is used as a metric variable, where "0" indicates no will-
ingness to take risk and "10" full willingness to take risks. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** ** ** signiﬁcant at 1% 5% 10%.
Source: SOEP, 2004. Authors’ own calculations.
23Table 5: Children’s secondary school track choice: Estimates using general risk taking
attitudes
Pr(y=lower sec.) Pr(y=secondary) Pr(y=upper sec.)
Average Marginal Effects
Mother: Risk averse (General) −0.007 0.016 −0.009
(0.024) (0.044) (0.045)
Mother: Risk loving (General) −0.046∗∗ 0.071 −0.025
(0.022) (0.044) (0.044)
Father: Risk averse (General) −0.025∗ 0.098∗ −0.073
(0.014) (0.053) (0.053)
Father: Risk loving (General) −0.024 0.048 −0.024
(0.016) (0.055) (0.056)
Notes: Multinomial Logit estimation, average marginal effects. N=1,249 (1,008) mother-
(father-)child observations. The estimations are separately estimated for the mother-child
and father-child sample and are based on the baseline speciﬁcation including the same set
of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses. *** ** ** signiﬁcant at 1% 5% 10%.
Source: SOEP, 2004. Authors’ own calculations.
24Table 6: Children’s secondary school track choice: Multinomial Logit estimates using risk
attitudes towards ﬁnancial assets
Pr(y=lower sec.) Pr(y=secondary) Pr(y=upper sec.)
Average Marginal Effects
Mother: Risk averse (Finance) 0.022 0.034 −0.055
(0.022) (0.035) (0.035)
Mother: Risk loving (Finance) −0.056∗∗∗ 0.044 0.012
(0.018) (0.040) (0.040)
Father: Risk averse (Finance) 0.017 0.093∗ −0.110∗∗
(0.019) (0.051) (0.053)
Father: Risk loving (Finance) −0.015 −0.004 0.019
(0.015) (0.045) (0.046)
Notes: Multinomial Logit estimation, average marginal effects. N=1,249 (1,000) mother-
(father-)child observations. The estimations are separately estimated for the mother-child
and father-child sample and are based on the baseline speciﬁcation including the same set
of controls variables. Standard errors in parentheses. *** ** ** signiﬁcant at 1% 5% 10%.
Source: SOEP, 2004. Authors’ own calculations.
25Table 7: Child’s secondary school track: Estimates by child’s gender
Average Marginal Effects
Mother-daughter (N=568) Pr(y=lower sec.) Pr(y=secondary) Pr(y=upper sec.)
Risk averse (Career) 0.085∗∗ 0.011 −0.096
(0.040) (0.058) (0.059)
Risk loving (Career) 0.018 −0.016 −0.002
(0.036) (0.059) (0.061)
Mother-son (N=639) Pr(y=lower sec.) Pr(y=secondary) Pr(y=upper sec.)
Risk averse (Career) 0.051 0.032 −0.083
(0.045) (0.059) (0.055)
Risk loving (Career) −0.049 0.031 0.018
(0.036) (0.055) (0.053)
Father-daughter (N=475) Pr(y=lower sec.) Pr(y=secondary) Pr(y=upper sec.)
Risk averse (Career) −0.052∗∗ 0.024 0.028
(0.022) (0.072) (0.076)
Risk loving (Career) −0.035 −0.136∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.056) (0.062)
Father-son (N=525) Pr(y=lower sec.) Pr(y=secondary) Pr(y=upper sec.)
Risk averse (Career) −0.005 0.001 0.003
(0.030) (0.068) (0.071)
Risk loving (Career) −0.020 0.059 −0.039
(0.024) (0.058) (0.059)
Notes: Multinomial Logit estimation, average marginal effects. The estimations are sepa-
rately estimated for the four samples and are based on the baseline speciﬁcation including
the same set of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses. *** ** ** signiﬁcant at
1% 5% 10%.
Source: SOEP, 2004. Authors’ own calculations.
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Figure 1: Simpliﬁed illustration of the German school system
Note: The German educational system is structured into three tracks (primary, secondary and
tertiary). The bold arrows specify the typical paths. The dashed arrows describe transitions
which are less common. Other school types (not shown) include comprehensive schools, spe-
cial schools and some few other, mainly privateprogressive education alternatives such as Wal-
dorf schools or Montessori schools. In some federal states, students with a lower secondary
school degree can achieve the intermediate school degree (Mittlere Reife) within one additional
year. Specialised secondary schools(Fachoberschule)offeran upperschooldegreethat, mainly
qualiﬁes for entrance in universities of applied sciences.
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Source: SOEP, 2004. Authors’ own calculations.
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Mother’s risk taking willingness
Lower sec.| mother’s education = Lower Sec.
Upper sec.| mother’s education = Lower Sec.
Lower sec.| mother’s education = Upper Sec.
Upper sec.| mother’s education = Upper Sec.
Figure 3: Predicted conditional school track choice probabilities
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33A. Appendix
Table A.1: Descriptive summary
Mother-child Mutter Father-child
(N=1,207) (N=1,000)
Variable Mean (Sda) Mean (Sda)
Child’s age 13.26 (1.40) 13.22 (1.42)
Parent’s age at birth 27.91 (4.96) 31.13 (5.70)
Number of siblings 1.41 (0.91) 1.48 (0.91)
Equiv. net household income (in e) 3176 (1829) 3389 (1898)
Male child 52.94 52.50
Child’s secondary school track
Lower track 25.10 22.70
Intermediate track 32.64 32.10
Upper track 42.25 45.20
Parent’s risk attitude
Risk averse 17.56 14.50
Risk neutral 64.79 63.00
Risk loving 17.65 22.50
Parent’s school degree
Lower track 25.43 30.90
Intermediate track 39.11 27.50






Migration background 15.99 19.20
Federal state with binding recommendation 43.74 43.00
Community size of resident
less than 2.000 14.25 14.10
2.000-5.000 (East:2.000-20.000) 12.92 12.10
5.000-20.000 25.27 28.10
20.000-50.000 (East:-100.000) 17.32 17.40
50.000-100.000 6.13 5.80
100.000-500.000 14.83 13.90
500.000 and more 9.28 8.60
Source: SOEP, 2004.
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